From corruption to sectarian division to terrorism, Africa's most populous country (and one of its most oil-rich) could find itself spiraling out of control
Followers of the Muslim Brothers of Nigeria stage a peaceful rally to mark "Qudus Day" in Nigeria 's northern city ofKano/ Reuters
A remote country faces a home-grown Muslim terrorism threat. The terrorists appear linked to al-Qaeda. The victimized country, despite its hapless police force and porous borders, proposes cracking down on the terrorists. Will the strategy work? And what's America to do?
The scenario is familiar. What's new is the setting: Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and the largest African exporter of oil to the U.S. Seemingly worlds apart from the anti-American terrorist breeding grounds ofYemenandPakistan, Nigeria counts among those countries who most admire the U.S. as well as among the top-ten oil exporters to America.
Last Friday, a homegrown fundamentalist group, devoted to violence, attacked theUnited Nations headquartersin Nigeria 's capital ofAbuja. The car-bomb blast killed at least 19 people and internationalized a brewing conflict that until now was domestic in scope and limited to Nigeria 's own peculiar tensions between Muslim and Christian, north and south.
The blast, the most serious act of terrorism against an international target in Nigeria 's 50-year history, has been largely reduced to a cartoon narrative: Islamic terrorists were bent on destruction of secular society. A complex set of conflicts, with a long history, got simplified, even by Nigeria 's own president, Goodluck Jonathan, who vowed to bring the terrorist group, Boko Haram, which took credit for the bombing, "under control."
The Nigerian government has brought Boko Haram under control before. In 2009, government forces raided the group's headquarters in the northeastern city ofMaiduguri. In the raid, the government captured Boko Haram's charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf. It produced a photo of Yusuf, naked from the waist up, his arms bound behind his back, surrounded by soldiers. Perhaps only minutes later, Yusuf was dead, executed. Hundreds of his supporters were also killed.
The killing of Yusuf seemed unremarkable at the time, because extra-judicial executions by police and the army are routine in Nigeria . Locals call these killings "instant justice." Human rights groups have well-documented the practice, which is partly the result of poor police training and a lack of confidence in the capacity of the Nigerian legal system to deliver accurate and timely trial verdicts. Unquestionably, Nigerians from every part of the country complain often about police misbehavior. Boko Haram's violent attacks, until recently, have targeted police officers, even killing some in their homes.
Poor policing bedevils Nigerian civil society, and no accommodations between various religious, ethnic, or regional groups in the country can stand without some new approach by security forces. As far back as 2002, when I served as a member of an Amnesty International survey team in Nigeria , reports of unauthorized killings by police were widespread and convincing. While killings of police by Boko Haram represent an ugly turn to conflict in Nigeria , they also highlight long-simmering resentments that go well beyond any fundamentalist agenda.
If the Nigerian military and police forces believed they had crushed Boko Haram by killing its charismatic leader and destroying its offices, they were wrong. The group, which favors a government under Islamic law and perhaps even its own independent nation in the north, has mounted a series of serious attacks in recent months. These reportedly include a December bombing in the city of Jos , a New Year's eve attack on military barracks in Abuja , several explosions around the time of President Goodluck Jonathan's May inauguration, and the bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja in June. Boko Haram is so powerful on its home turf of Maidugira, provincial capital of one of Nigeria 's most conservative Muslim sub-regions of Nigeria , the semi-arid northeast, that BBC's superbWest Africacorrespondent, Andrew Walker, once described Maidugira as a "city of fear."
The resurgence of Boko Haram coincides with disenchantment in the Muslim north with the election of a Jonathan, a southern Christian, who became president after illness killed his predecessor, a Muslim northerner. In the peculiar tradition of Nigerian presidential politics, in which the office traditionally alternates between the country's two religions, the election victory earlier this year should have gone to a Muslim. Instead of stepping aside, however, Jonathan chose to run for a full term of office, and his victory this spring fueled greater regional tensions of which the violence by Boko Haram is only a piece.
The government's militarized, violent reaction against Boko Haram might seem understandable. The group after all specializes in murdering Nigerian policemen stationed in the northeast of the country. Yet this hardliner reaction contrasts sharply with the government's more restrained response to a Christian-led insurgency in theNigerDelta, which targeted Western oil companies operating in southern Nigeria and the violence of which peaked a few years ago.
The oil rebellion was led by youths from Jonathan's own ethnic group, the Ija, whose grievances centered around the theft of oil revenues by the government and the failure to share oil wealth with the many different ethnic groups of the Delta, of which the Ijaw is the largest. Rather than use counter-insurgency tactics against the fighters, the Nigerian government, first under Jonathan's predecessor and then under him, promoted dialogue and amnesty to those who stopped attacking oil companies and laid down their arms.
The tactics worked. Unrest in the Niger Delta has retreated. Could the same formula be used to rob support in the north for Boko Haram?
The question should sit at the center of any international response to Nigeria 's crisis. Muslim-Christian relations are not rosy anywhere, but in Nigeria the barometer of ecumenical health is critical to the fate of the nation. Nigeria is the only sizeable nation in the world -- with a population estimated at roughly 150 million, or one in every six sub-Saharan Africans -- where Christians and Muslims are about evenly split.
Muslim grievances, while often exaggerated here, are not imagined. Nigeria 's oil sits entirely in the Christian-dominated south. Southerners also dominate the civil service, partly because of their relatively higher levels of education. Even the Nigerian Diaspora -- at least one million Nigerian-born people, including many of the country's best trained doctors, scientists, accountants, and teachers live in the U.S. , Britain andCanada-- is largely Christian. The best-known Nigerian writers tend to be Christian: Chimamanda Adiche, Chinua Achebe, the late Ken Saro-Wiwa, and Nobel laureate Wole Soynika. Nigeria 's burgeoning "Nollywood" movie industry is also dominated by Southerners, notably the traditionally Catholic Igbo ethnic group.
In short, the Nigerian voices heard most loudly around the world, and in Nigeria itself, are Christian and secular, reinforcing the sense among Nigeria 's Muslims that they are invisible, and all the fear and anxiety that produces. Through resistance to Western education, mores, and even medicine, northerners in Nigeria try to make their voices heard. Through the practice of polygamy and girl mutilation, northerners also show their resistance to what they view as the hegemony of Christian values. And in their fidelity to regional power-sharing, northern Muslims continue to imagine a Nigerian nation in which there's space enough for two capacious religious traditions that often seem at odds.